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Abstract 1 
Since 2009, the UK witnessed marked increases in the rate of sanctions applied to 2 
unemployment insurance claimants, as part of wider agenda of austerity and welfare 3 
reform. In 2013, over 1 million sanctions were applied, stopping benefit payments for 4 
a minimum of four weeks and potentially leaving people facing economic hardship 5 
and driving them to use food banks. Here we explore whether sanctioning is 6 
associated with food bank use by linking data from The Trussell Trust Foodbank 7 
Network with records on sanctioning rates across 259 local authorities in the UK. 8 
After accounting for local authority differences and time trends, the rate of adults fed 9 
by food banks rose by an additional 3.36 adults per 100,000 (95% CI: 1.71 to 5.01) as 10 
the rate of sanctioning increased by 10 per 100,000 adults. The availability of food 11 
distribution sites affected how tightly sanctioning and food bank usage were 12 
associated (p<0.001); in areas with few distribution sites, rising sanctions led to 13 
smaller increases in food bank usage. In conclusion, sanctioning is closely linked with 14 
rising food bank usage, but the impact of sanctioning on household food insecurity is 15 
not fully reflected in available data. 16 
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Insufficient and insecure household incomes, particularly short-term income losses, put 19 
households at risk of food insecurity—that is, inadequate access to food (Leete and Bania, 20 
2010; Loopstra and Tarasuk, 2013; Ribar and Hamrick, 2003; Tarasuk et al., 2014; Huang et 21 
al., 2010). A growing body of evidence shows how government policies can either increase 22 
or reduce household food insecurity by changing access to social security programmes 23 
(Arteaga et al., 2016; Ionescu-Ittu et al., 2015; Loopstra et al., 2015a; McIntyre et al., 2016).  24 
One aspect of social security policy that may increase food insecurity among low-income 25 
households is the practice of sanctioning, which abrogates financial support to unemployed 26 
persons receiving unemployment insurance if they fail to meet criteria for seeking work. 27 
Unemployment insurance acts as a buffer against household income shocks, smoothing food 28 
consumption at the micro level (Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2005). Sanctions, in contrast, by 29 
temporarily removing this buffer, may therefore affect access to food. Yet empirical evidence 30 
on the impact of sanctioning has been limited; and so advocates of welfare conditionality 31 
have argued that sanctions encourage re-employment without exacerbating food insecurity.  32 
This debate is particularly pertinent to the UK, where a rapid rise in the number of people 33 
being sanctioned was concurrent with a large increase in the distribution of emergency food 34 
parcels over 2011 to 2013 following governmental efforts to increase benefit conditionality 35 
and more severely penalize non-compliance (Watts et al., 2014). The Trussell Trust –the 36 
UK’s largest food bank network – has reported that sanctions are a key reason why people 37 
receive referrals to their member food banks (The Trussell Trust, 2014). Frontline food aid 38 
providers tell a similar story, reinforcing the conclusions of other investigations into food 39 
bank usage in the UK (Forsey, 2014; Perry et al., 2014).  40 
   





There are reasons to be cautious of this claim, however. Food bank usage may have risen 41 
during this period regardless of any changes to welfare conditionality and sanctions. For 42 
example, food parcel distribution may have increased because the number of food banks rose 43 
(Loopstra et al., 2015c) or the number of hours the food banks were open increased. 44 
Similarly, background economic factors in the British economy, such as high unemployment, 45 
could have created additional financial pressures leading to food bank usage even if sanctions 46 
were not increasing (Lambie-Mumford and Dowler, 2015; Loopstra et al., 2016).  47 
As highlighted in a recent UK National Audit Office (NAO) report (Comptroller and Auditor 48 
General, 2016), the impact of sanctioning on material hardship is not well-understood. Here, 49 
we ask, does temporarily stopping people’s social security payments drive them to food 50 
banks? We conceptualize food bank usage as a marker of severe food insecurity to examine 51 
the dynamic relationship between sanctioning and food insecurity using data harmonised data 52 
from 392 Trussell Trust Foodbanks in 259 local authorities over 2012 to 2015. 53 
Background 54 
Benefit conditionality and sanctioning in social security systems  55 
Internationally, there has been increasing experimentation with using active labour market 56 
programmes to incentivise changes in behaviour among social security recipients (Watts et 57 
al., 2014). This is part of a wider trend of increasing welfare conditionality in social security 58 
systems, whereby individuals’ entitlement to state support has become increasingly 59 
dependent on meeting an expanding number of behavioural conditions, such as regular 60 
meetings with work coaches and showing adequate evidence of job search activity, among 61 
others. These conditions vary across countries but so too does the strictness of requirements  62 
and how closely they are monitored (Venn, 2012). For example, in some countries, 63 
   





jobseekers are required to show job search activity only on request, where in others, proof 64 
must be shown to work coaches weekly or every second week.  65 
Sanctioning penalties also differ depending on context, but generally the threat of sanctioning 66 
(and the sanctions themselves) is assumed to incentivise unemployed persons to seek 67 
employment and reduce potential gaming behaviour (Watts et al., 2014; Venn, 2012). In 68 
many countries, sanctions are rarely applied, and countries employ warning systems to alert 69 
recipients of the potential for a sanction to be imposed. Others impose a penalty of reduced 70 
income support for only 1-2 weeks (Venn, 2012) or stop payments altogether. 71 
The employment outcomes of sanctioning policies have been widely debated (Watts et al., 72 
2014). Theoretically, sanctions encourage people to find work faster by increasing job search 73 
efforts among those who are sanctioned and those who want to avoid being sanctioned. 74 
Sanctions are also imposed for failure to take offered work, encouraging people to accept the 75 
first opportunity rather than waiting for a better future opportunity. Yet, quantitative studies 76 
examining employment outcomes have found mixed results, potentially because they increase 77 
the quantity not the quality of the job search and fail to take into account the nature and 78 
supply of employment opportunities available (Arni et al., 2013; Webster, 2016; Boockmann 79 
et al., 2014; Lalive et al., 2005; van der Klaauw and Van Ours, 2013). There are also 80 
concerns about the fairness of the practice (Work and Pensions Committee, 2015), given 81 
evidence that disadvantaged groups are more likely to be sanctioned than others and that 82 
sanctions may actually reduce re-employment among particular vulnerable groups (Reeves 83 
and Loopstra, 2017; Comptroller and Auditor General, 2016).  84 
Although sanctions may improve employment-outcomes for some, they may also create 85 
health and social harms for others because they reduce incomes for people who are more 86 
likely to be financially vulnerable. Little is known about the health and social consequences 87 
   





of sanctioning, and in particular, on whether or not sanctioning may mean that people cannot 88 
afford basic needs, such as food. Following welfare reforms in the United States, families that 89 
had been sanctioned were more likely to have experienced poverty and inadequate access to 90 
food than families who had not been sanctioned (Cook et al., 2002; Kalil et al., 2002). 91 
Similarly, one longitudinal study of new parents found that mothers who reported their 92 
benefit payments reduced or eliminated in the past 12 months due to sanctions were more 93 
likely to report experiences of food insecurity for themselves and their children (Reichman et 94 
al., 2005). To our knowledge, no quantitative studies examining the relationship between 95 
welfare sanctioning polices and household food insecurity have been conducted in a 96 
European context. Given that sanctioning is now considered integral to many Western 97 
nations’ social security approaches, it is critical to understand how this practice impacts 98 
access to food. 99 
Sanctions and the broader context of welfare reform 100 
In 2010, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government announced a programme 101 
of wide-sweeping reforms aimed at reducing the deficit, with a particular focus on reducing 102 
welfare costs (HM Treasury, 2010). School budgets, the NHS, and pensions were protected, 103 
but budgets for local government services, social care, and welfare benefits were reduced 104 
dramatically (De Agostini et al., 2017; Lupton et al., 2015). 105 
Alongside targeted actions to reduce welfare spending (for example, lost or reduced 106 
entitlement to Housing Benefit and Child Benefit for some claimants, the introduction of 107 
Benefit Caps, and benefit freezes), a number of welfare reforms also made it harder for 108 
claimants to qualify, and maintain the requirements, for benefit receipt. Employment and 109 
Support Allowance (ESA) claimants were newly required to undergo Work Capability 110 
Assessments to determine their eligibility for the benefit. Those placed in the work-related 111 
   





activity group were additionally required to engage in work-related activity, such as job 112 
searches, work preparation schemes, and practice job interviews, in order to maintain receipt 113 
of benefits (Dwyer et al., 2016; Barr et al., 2015). Similarly, these types of conditions were 114 
intensified for lone parents claiming Income Support with children aged 5 or older (Johnsen, 115 
2016). As a further move toward greater conditionality, the Claimant Commitment was 116 
introduced for Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claimants (Department for Work and Pensions, 117 
2013) and, in 2013, everyone claiming Universal Credit. These commitments, determined by 118 
Jobcentre Advisors, outline job-seeking actions that claimants must follow in order to be 119 
eligible for these benefits. Failure to meet outlined requirements means claimants are 120 
disentitled from benefits altogether or temporarily have their benefits stopped. Together, 121 
these actions, which make it harder for people to comply with benefit conditions, also mean 122 
reducing spending on welfare claims as claimants move off benefits - sometimes into work, 123 
but also not (Work and Pensions Committee, 2015; Loopstra et al., 2015b; Reeves, 2017). 124 
As highlighted, benefit conditionality is often buttressed by sanctions for failure to comply. 125 
Although behaviour-related conditionality and accompanying sanctions are now more than 20 126 
years old, the 2012 reforms initiated a step-change with the Coalition introducing one of the 127 
strictest sanctioning regimes across OECD countries. Sanctioning penalties were intensified, 128 
stopping benefit payments with immediate effect for a new minimum of 4 weeks, 129 
representing a £300 reduction for a single claimant aged 25 or over (Comptroller and Auditor 130 
General, 2016). For more serious offences, penalty periods were extended to a minimum of 131 
13 weeks, and up to 156 weeks (Department of Work and Pensions, 2013).  132 
Monthly rates of sanctions applied to claimants nearly doubled between 2009 and 2013, with 133 
about 3% of claimants sanctioned each month in 2009 to over 6% of claimants sanctioned 134 
every month in 2013 (Figure 1). This dramatic rise has been linked with the expansion of the 135 
Work Programme in 2011 and the introduction of the 2012 Welfare Reform Act (Webster, 136 
   





2016), which tightened the criteria for receipt of JSA and marked an active push to increase 137 
welfare conditionalities as part of a broader agenda of creating active citizenship (Reeves and 138 
Loopstra, 2017). In 2013, over 1 million sanctions were applied.  139 
[Figure 1 here] 140 
 141 
Welfare reform and the rise of food banks in the UK 142 
Welfare reform is the backdrop for the dramatic rise in food bank usage since the Great 143 
Recession. The Trussell Trust Foodbank Network has reported rising demand for their 144 
services in recent years, evidenced by the rapid expansion of their franchise emergency food 145 
aid model, the Foodbank, and accompanying rising numbers of food parcels being distributed 146 
(Lambie-Mumford, 2013). In 2011, the Trust reported about 129,000 instances of people 147 
receiving food from their member food banks. By 2014/15, the number had climbed to almost 148 
1.1 million (The Trussell Trust, 2015). Early examinations of the patterned growth of the 149 
network have found food banks were more likely to open in areas of higher unemployment, 150 
and in areas that had experienced deeper reductions in the amount of spending going out to 151 
local authorities for local services and welfare support (Loopstra et al., 2015c). These 152 
findings matched qualitative studies that found local social service agencies and community 153 
members, in the face of reduced budgets, turning to The Trussell Trust model as a source of 154 
service delivery (Lambie-Mumford, 2013). Since then, many other studies have linked 155 
demand for food banks with aspects of benefit reform, including longer wait times to receive 156 
benefit payments, the abolition of the social fund, loss of entitlements and benefit transitions 157 
(Perry et al., 2014; The Trussell Trust, 2017; Fitzpatrick et al., 2016a; Garratt et al., 2016; 158 
Forsey, 2014). In-depth interviews with people using food banks conducted by Perry et al. 159 
(2014) revealed the range of challenges faced by people using food banks, such as loss of a 160 
   





job or partner or disability, but also noted that most often it was the acute impact of losing 161 
welfare entitlements or the inability to access welfare in these circumstances that led to their 162 
food bank referral. Thus, the evidence suggests that the rapid rise of food bank use from 163 
2011, and persistence of high rates across the country since, are cumulative outcomes of the 164 
many changes to the benefit system over this period.  165 
Quantitatively linking these changes to changing food bank usage is difficult, however, due 166 
to the number of changes that occurred, and different rollouts of the reforms geographically 167 
and over time. While the rise in food bank use matched the timing of when these reforms 168 
were rolled out (i.e. beginning in 2011 and ongoing through to 2015), at the aggregate level, 169 
the growth in numbers using food banks is hard to disentangle from new food banks 170 
beginning to operate in places where they had not been previously seen.  171 
The intensification of conditionality and subsequent rise in sanctions is one possible 172 
exception—a discrete change in welfare receipt that can be tested using quantitative methods. 173 
The Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) data available document the number of 174 
sanctions applied to claimants each month, charting the variation in local authorities across 175 
space and time. This variation can be linked to variation in food bank use over time within 176 
local areas. While we might expect there to be variation in the level of sanctions across areas 177 
due to differences in population characteristics, examining how rates of food bank use 178 
associated with changes in sanctioning within a given area removes these endogenous 179 
characteristics, tracking only changes in the application of sanctions--a largely exogenous 180 
source of variation arising from policy changes over this period.  181 
The uncertain link between sanctions and food bank use 182 
The impact of sanctioning on food bank use continues to be debated. A small-scale 183 
questionnaire delivered to people using three food banks across England found that 20-30% 184 
   





had recently been affected by sanctions (Perry et al., 2014), but this evidence has been 185 
dismissed by policymakers. In a House of Commons debate in 2015, the previous Minister 186 
for Employment, Priti Patel, stated that “there is no robust evidence that directly links 187 
sanctions and food bank use” because the “reasons for food bank use are complex and 188 
overlapping” (HC Debate 22 June 2015 vol 595 c608). Indeed, previous studies and evidence 189 
reviews, which rely on cross-sectional and anecdotal data, have been unable to disentangle 190 
whether there is a dynamic and systematic relationship between sanctioning rates and food 191 
bank usage (Forsey, 2014; Loopstra et al., 2015c; Perry et al., 2014). Without longitudinal 192 
data, the nature of the relationship between sanctioning and food bank usage is difficult to 193 
resolve. 194 
The problem of hidden hunger is one important issue that may contribute to uncertainty in 195 
the relationship between sanctions and food bank usage. Food insecurity underlies food bank 196 
usage (Loopstra and Tarasuk, 2012; Loopstra and Lalor, 2017), but is not regularly 197 
measured in any UK survey.  In the absence of monitoring of household food insecurity in 198 
household surveys, data on food bank usage is often the only available indicator of the 199 
problem of hunger in high-income countries (Loopstra and Tarasuk, 2015). But a significant 200 
degree of hidden hunger can exist. In the case of the UK, and relevant to the understanding 201 
the relationship between sanctioning and food bank usage, if someone is sanctioned and 202 
unable to afford food, their ability to access emergency food may be largely determined by 203 
the availability of a food bank distribution centre in their area. Thus, if sanction rates go up 204 
in an area where there are far fewer distribution centres, then food parcel distribution may 205 
only be weakly associated with sanctioning rates even though hunger is potentially rising. In 206 
short, hidden hunger may introduce uncertainty in the relationship between sanctioning rates 207 
and food bank usage.  208 
   





Further complicating this picture is that after 2013, the number of sanctions applied to JSA 209 
claimants in the UK declined; this is in part because the number of claimants has also 210 
declined, but even as a proportion of claimants, sanction rates have reduced (Figure 1). This 211 
fall in sanctioning has not corresponded with a decline in the aggregated number of people 212 
receiving food parcels in The Trussell Trust Network. In 2013/14, The Trussell Trust 213 
reported 913,138 instances of food parcel distribution, but in 2014/15, this number increased 214 
to 1,084,604, and further increased to 1,109,309 in 2015/16.   215 
The disconnect in these trends is not well understood, but may be explained by two different 216 
processes. One is that the spread of the food bank network as a whole may obscure levels of 217 
rising or falling need attributable to sanctions for any specific local area because total 218 
numbers are in part driven by the availability of food banks to distribute food. Over 2011 to 219 
2014, new Trussell Trust food banks opened in places where they were not operating before, 220 
which means people in need in these communities could newly use food banks where they 221 
were unable to before. Alternatively, food banks can also leave The Trussell Trust Network, 222 
no longer reporting the number of parcels they are distributing to the national Trussell Trust 223 
office. In short, disentangling the relationship between sanctions and food bank usage 224 
requires accounting for the number of food banks in these areas and should focus on the 225 
trends within these local areas. The other possible explanation is that sanctions may lead to 226 
longer term financial hardships, whereby increases in the number of sanctions applied are 227 
associated with increases in food bank usage, but declines may not equally relate to declines 228 
in food bank usage.  229 
To explore the relationship between sanctioning and food bank use, accounting for the 230 
potential impact of the supply of food banks on this relationship, we compiled a novel 231 
database linking quarterly sanctioning rates in local authorities to area-level food bank usage 232 
data from The Trussell Trust over fiscal years 2012 to 2015. We additionally incorporated 233 
   





data on network characteristics to understand how the provision of food assistance influences 234 
the sanctioning-food bank usage relationship. We draw on these data to ask, how do rates of 235 
sanctioning vary with rates of food bank usage? We also explore if declines in number of 236 
sanctions have meant fewer people needing food assistance. Lastly, we examine how the 237 
availability of Trussell Trust assistance affects the relationship between sanctioning and food 238 
bank usage. Specifically, we investigate whether the impact of sanctioning on food insecurity 239 
may not be reflected in Trussell Trust food bank usage figures where their food banks are less 240 
available, thereby providing evidence that the true impact of sanctioning on hunger is 241 
potentially obscured by the data available.   242 
 243 
 Methods 244 
Source of Data 245 
We collected data on food bank usage from The Trussell Trust, an umbrella organisation for 246 
424 member food banks in the UK, comprised of over 1200 distribution sites in churches or 247 
community centres (The Trussell Trust, 2016). While there are numerous food banks that 248 
operate independently in the UK, The Trussell Trust is the only franchise model that operates 249 
nationally, creating a source of comparative and harmonised data. Each member food bank is 250 
responsible for obtaining referrals from local social service agencies. Referred persons 251 
receive a food parcel meant to provide three days’ worth of food for all household members.  252 
Data from referral vouchers are entered into the central Trussell Trust database. We received 253 
access to aggregated data from each food bank in the network, collated on a quarterly basis 254 
for fiscal years 2012/13 to 2015/16. These data provide the number of instances in which 255 
adults and children received food parcels, reflecting usage volume rather than number of 256 
individuals served. The number of unique individuals helped by Trussell Trust food banks 257 
   





has not been tracked. We use the number of adults fed scaled relative to the size of local adult 258 
population, but these numbers cannot be interpreted as a quarterly prevalence rate, as some 259 
individuals may have received food parcels on more than one occasion in the same quarter. 260 
We also obtained information on food bank postcodes, the year food banks were initiated, the 261 
number of distribution sites affiliated with the food bank, and the hours of operation at each 262 
distribution site from The Trussell Trust to enable description of area-level food bank 263 
operations.  264 
Sanctioning and Unemployment Data 265 
We obtained government data for local authorities in the UK on the number of people 266 
claiming JSA, the number of sanctions applied to JSA claimants, unemployment and 267 
employment rates, deprivation ranking (England only), rural-urban classification (England 268 
only) and population size from Nomis, Stat Xplore, and UK Government Statistics databases. 269 
Sanction data are the number of sanctions applied to claimants, summed over the months in 270 
each quarter, which were available up to the second quarter of 2015/16. Similar to food bank 271 
data, these do not pertain to individuals, so the same claimant could have received more than 272 
one sanction in the same quarter. Monthly claimant data were averaged over the quarter to 273 
provide an estimate of the quarterly claimant count. We use unemployment and employment 274 
data in our sensitivity analyses. These are aggregated data from the Annual Population 275 
Survey. At the local authority level, Nomis provides data for 12-month periods beginning 276 
every quarter.  277 
Analytic sample 278 
We restricted our sample to local authorities in Scotland, Wales, and England, as sanctioning 279 
data were unavailable for Northern Ireland. We excluded five local authorities with small 280 
population sizes (City of London, Isles of Scilly, Orkney Islands, Shetland Islands, and 281 
   





Eilean Siar). Food bank postcodes were used to link food banks to their respective local 282 
authority areas, resulting in a sum of the total number fed, sum of distribution sites operating, 283 
and sum of total operating hours for the local authority that varied across quarters. We 284 
excluded food banks and corresponding local authorities which did not consistently collect 285 
data each quarter over 2012/13 until the end of 2015/16 (n= 15) and also those authorities in 286 
which Trussell Trust food banks do not operate (n= 101). This yielded a final analytical 287 
dataset of 259 local authorities spanning 16 quarters (Web Figure A2). Descriptive statistics 288 
showing rates of feeding and the number of food banks operating for local authorities over 289 
time are shown in Web Table A1 and in Web Figure A3.  290 
Statistical Analysis 291 
First, we examined how the rate of sanctions applied in local authority populations relates to 292 
food parcel distribution. We use a fixed-effects model to control for unobserved differences 293 
across local authorities and time, asking if the instances of adults receiving food assistance is 294 
dynamically related to the number of sanctions applied in the population, as follows:  295 
Fedit= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Sanctionsit+𝛽2Claimantsit+ β3Season + β4First + β5Distributionit + β6Hoursit + μ𝑖   296 
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡    297 
Here, i denotes the local authority and t denotes the time point. Fed is the quarterly number of 298 
instances adults received food parcels per 100,000 adults in the population. Sanctions is the 299 
number of sanctions applied per 100,000 adults, and Claimants is the number of JSA 300 
claimants per 100,000 working age adults. Season is a dummy variable for first, second, 301 
third, and fourth quarters to account for seasonal trends in food parcel distribution. First is a 302 
dummy variable denoting the first quarter a food bank opened in local authorities if they 303 
opened after April 2012. Distribution is the number of food bank distribution sites operating 304 
in local authority. Hours is the total number of hours food banks open per week. μ𝑖 denotes 305 
   





local-authority fixed-effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the random error term. In subsequent models, we 306 
include an adjustment for linear and quadratic time trends to account for secular trends in the 307 
numbers fed, sanctions applied, and JSA claimants across the UK over this time period. 308 
Next, using a first difference model, we unpacked whether increasing sanctions from the 309 
previous quarter is associated with an increase in adult food bank usage, and in turn, whether 310 
a decline in the number of sanctions is associated with a decline in adult food bank usage, 311 
thus testing the acute dynamic relationship from quarter to quarter in numbers fed in relation 312 
to number of sanctions applied. To do this, we created two time-varying measures of 313 
sanctions: one capturing increases from the previous quarter and the other decreases. For 314 
each, changes in the opposite directions were coded as zero.  315 
Lastly, we explored the potential problem of hidden hunger, whereby, for a given increase in 316 
the number of sanctions applied, the extent to which this may lead to food insecurity is not 317 
fully reflected in food bank usage. In places where sanctions have increased, people who 318 
experience food insecurity as a result may not be able to reach food banks where food banks 319 
are less available; this would temper an observed relationship between sanctions and food 320 
bank usage, resulting in a downward bias in our estimate of the impact of sanctions. To 321 
investigate this, we examined the interaction between change in the number of sanctions 322 
applied, with the level of food bank operations in a given local authority-year, namely the 323 
number of distribution sites and the number of operating hours.  324 
Results 325 
The number of operating Trussell Trust food banks increased from 138 sites in 114 local 326 
authorities in the first quarter of 2012/13 to 392 food banks in 259 local authorities in the last 327 
quarter of 2015/16 (Web Table A1). The average rate of feeding across local authorities with 328 
food banks rose from about 18,855 adult users per 100,000 over April to June 2012, to a high 329 
   





of 52,468 per 100,000 over January to March 2014. As shown in Web Figure A2, trends in 330 
food bank usage are more telling after accounting for growth of the Network. Though food 331 
bank usage generally exhibits a growth curve, whereby usage accelerates in the first 6-12 332 
months after food banks are launched, evidence of growth in food bank usage through 2013 333 
and 2014 in places where food banks were already well-established and constant after 2011, 334 
suggests there was increasing demand over and above the supply of food banks over 2013 335 
and 2014, but that in 2015, food bank use started to decline.  336 
Figure 2 shows the correlation between the rate of sanctions applied in local authorities and 337 
the rate of adults fed for one quarter, January to March 2014. Here, we see evidence that in 338 
places where the rate of sanctioning was higher, the rate of adult food bank usage was also 339 
higher (r=0.26; p=<0.0001). 340 
[Figure 2 here] 341 
Table 1 shows how quarterly rates of food bank usage among adults related to the number of 342 
sanctions applied in the population each quarter over 2012 to 2015, after accounting for local 343 
authority differences. For every 10 sanctions applied per 100,000 in the population, the rate 344 
of adult food bank users was 6.44 per 100,000 adults higher (95% CI: 4.72 to 8.15). This 345 
association remained robust after adjusting for the scale of food bank operations and how 346 
long food banks had been operating (Table 1, Model 2). Lastly, we adjusted for linear and 347 
quadratic time trends. Though attenuated, the relationship between sanctioning and food bank 348 
use remained strong: for every 10 additional sanctions applied, the rate of food bank users per 349 
100,000 was about 3.36 higher (95% CI: 1.71 to 5.01). 350 
[Table 1 here] 351 
To put these figures in context, rates of sanctioning applied in local populations rose from a 352 
mean of 302 per 100,000 adults over the April to June quarter of 2012/13 to 340 per 100,000 353 
   





over the July to September quarter of 2013/14. Our model predicts this increase in JSA 354 
sanctioning would account for about 5-10% of the increase in the rate of food bank usage 355 
observed over this period.  356 
When we delineated the effects of acute increases in sanctions applied from the previous 357 
quarter from acute declines (Table 2), we observed that for increases in sanctions, 358 
specifically, every 10 additional sanctions applied was associated with about 5 more adults 359 
fed in food banks (95% CI: 3.00 to 7.40). A decline of 10 sanctions from the previous quarter 360 
was associated with a decline of about 2 adults fed (95% CI: -3.23 to -0.34). 361 
[Table 2 here] 362 
Lastly, we examined how the dynamic relationship between change in sanctions applied and 363 
change in the number of adults fed was affected by the scale of food bank operations in local 364 
authorities (Web Table A2). The number of distribution sites available in local authorities 365 
significantly modified the observed relationship between the change in sanctions and the 366 
change in numbers fed. This is illustrated in Figure 3. In local authorities with few 367 
distribution sites per capita (< 1 per 100,000), if the number of sanctions increased by 20 per 368 
100,000, there was not a corresponding significant increase in the number of adult food bank 369 
users. But for local authorities with 5 distribution sites or more operating per 100,000, an 370 
increase in 20 sanctions per 100,000 related to an estimated increase of about 10 more adult 371 
food bank users. 372 
Sensitivity Analyses 373 
We performed a series of sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of our models to 374 
alternate specifications. To test the possibility that the association between sanctions and food 375 
bank use was spurious, driven by higher rates of unemployment, we additionally adjusted our 376 
models for employment and unemployment rates and found our results unchanged (Web 377 
   





Table A4). We also checked for outliers (i.e. observations with residuals > |2SD|) and 378 
extreme observations to ensure our estimates were not being driven by these observations. No 379 
observations met our criteria for outliers. After removing observations with extreme quarterly 380 
changes in rates of feeding (i.e. > the 99th percentile), our results were unchanged (Web Table 381 
A5).  382 
We also re-ran our models using a random effects framework and adjusting for time-invariant 383 
characteristics to explore the relationship between sanctions and food bank use after adjusting 384 
for a wider set of area-level characteristics: specifically the Index of Multiple Deprivation, 385 
the ESA claimant rate, 2011 census data on lone parenthood and disability, and rural-urban 386 
classification. Due to many of these variables only being available for England, these models 387 
were only conducted for English local authorities (Web Table A6). We found, consistent with 388 
earlier studies of these relationships (e.g. (Lambie-Mumford and Green, 2017; Vidgen et al., 389 
2016) that food bank use was higher in more deprived local authorities and with higher rates 390 
of disability and lone parenthood. However, even after adjusting for these area-factors, we 391 
observed the relationship between sanction rates and food bank use to be consistent with our 392 
fixed-effect models.  393 
Discussion 394 
Our findings suggest a strong, dynamic relationship exists between the number of sanctions 395 
applied in local authorities and instances of adults receiving emergency food parcels. As the 396 
quarterly rate of sanctioning rose in local authorities, the rate of adults receiving food 397 
assistance also rose. We observed that a quarter-to-quarter increase of 10 sanctions per 398 
100,000 was associated with about 5 more instances of adults needing food, while a decline 399 
in 10 sanctions applied was associated with about 2 fewer instances of adults needing food. 400 
The extent to which sanctioning is reflected in demand for food assistance from The Trussell 401 
   





Trust depends on availability of distribution sites in a given area. Where distribution sites 402 
were not widely available to the population to use (as measured by distribution sites per 403 
capita), there was not a corresponding increase in the numbers fed, even if more people were 404 
sanctioned.  405 
Our study uses the best current data available to examine the relationship between 406 
sanctioning and food bank usage but there are still some important limitations. We were only 407 
able to use data at the area level and so our results could be vulnerable to ecological fallacy, 408 
where rates of sanctioning correlate with food bank usage, but do not mean that the people 409 
sanctioned are the same individuals who show up in food banks. Our area level findings are 410 
consistent with those observed among individuals in reports from frontline food assistance 411 
providers and qualitative studies, however (Forsey, 2014; Perry et al., 2014; Garthwaite, 412 
2016; Fitzpatrick et al., 2016b).  413 
To our knowledge, The Trussell Trust data are the only source of longitudinal and 414 
harmonised data on food bank usage in the UK, but are influenced by factors that we could 415 
not control for. The data are a measure of volume and do not reflect the number of unique 416 
users each quarter. This may lead to variation across local areas and over time if there are 417 
differences in frequency of use between places or over time. Each member food bank also 418 
establishes relationships with local referral agencies, and these relationships are not always 419 
stable, which may affect how easily people in a given area are able to receive help from their 420 
local food bank.  421 
Similarly, sanction data are limited by how they are recorded. While the government provides 422 
information on claims where adverse and non-adverse decisions were made and whether the 423 
decision was based on an original decision, mandatory reconsideration, or appeal, they do not 424 
provide information on the total number of original adverse decisions (Comptroller and 425 
   





Auditor General, 2016). These data would be important for tracking the impact of sanctions 426 
in a given quarter because during the reconsideration and appeals process, claimants have 427 
their benefit payments stopped; the month that an appeals decision is recorded could be one 428 
or two months after a claimant first had his/her payments stopped. We based our data on 429 
original adverse decisions because we could not know with certainty that claimants had 430 
sanctions applied in these months, but using only these figures mean our estimates have 431 
likely underestimated the impact of sanctioning on food bank usage. Data on the number of 432 
people receiving Universal Credit, a new benefit in the UK subject to conditionality, are also 433 
not available, which also means the full impact of sanctioning practices on food bank usage 434 
cannot be charted. These data limitations would introduce error in our estimates that would 435 
tend to bias our results toward the null; however, despite these data limitations, we observed 436 
a strong and dynamic relationship between sanctioning and food bank usage.  437 
By focussing on the acute impact of sanctions and using difference models, we have not 438 
examined the influence of other changes to social policy that appear to have played a role in 439 
the rise of food bank usage, as outlined above. While earlier analyses have examined some of 440 
these links (Loopstra et al., 2015c), as have qualitative studies (e.g. Garthwaite, 2016; Perry 441 
et al., 2014), more research is needed to further explore how welfare reforms already 442 
implemented and those ongoing, in particular, the rollout of Universal Credit, may be 443 
impacting on the ability for households to afford food.  444 
This study addresses critical gaps in the literature. Like earlier work, we find a consistent and 445 
strong positive relationship between sanctioning rates and food bank use (Loopstra et al., 446 
2015c; Fitzpatrick et al., 2016b; Garthwaite, 2016), but this work addresses limitations of 447 
these earlier papers by accounting for changes in The Trussell Trust network and cross-local 448 
variation in distribution sites.  These data do not allow us to firmly establish causality but the 449 
associations we document are certainly consistent with a causal explanation. In addition, we 450 
   





explicitly consider what happens to people who are sanctioned in areas where there are fewer 451 
food banks. Our models suggest there are places in Britain where sanctioning rates are high 452 
but food bank usage rates are low and that appears to be the case where food aid distribution 453 
is limited, highlighting the possibility of hidden hunger, namely people who lack both access 454 
to food financially and who cannot access emergency food assistance.  455 
Our results intervene in the ongoing debate about the drivers of rising food bank usage. 456 
Government officials have suggested sanctions have no impact on food bank use according to 457 
the evidence available (HC Debate 22 June 2015 vol 595 c608). Here, we have shown a 458 
robust empirical link between sanctioning and food bank usage. This has important policy 459 
implications. The recent decline in sanctioning is a positive sign, and has likely contributed to 460 
the decline in the numbers of people using food banks within local authorities in 2015/16. 461 
Yet, in 2015, there were still about 358,000 sanctions applied to JSA claimants, with the net 462 
cost to sanctioned jobseekers (total cost of sanctions minus hardship payments) just under 463 
£100 million (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2016). We also observed that declines in 464 
sanctioning were not as strongly linked to declines in food bank usage, explaining why the 465 
decline in food bank usage has not been as fast as the decline in sanctions. This could be 466 
because experiences of sanctions trigger longer-term financial crises, such as debt 467 
accumulation. A recent report from one Trussell Trust food bank (West Cheshire) found that 468 
people who received food bank referrals for the reason of being sanctioned were more likely 469 
to have crises that lasted for 3 months or more (Garratt et al., 2016). It may also be the case 470 
that longer length sanctioning penalties lead to longer term food bank usage.  471 
It is possible sanctions may positively affect employment outcomes. A preliminary analysis 472 
of the Work Programme by the NAO found that JSA claimants who received a sanction were 473 
more likely to move into employment than those who were not sanctioned (Comptroller and 474 
Auditor General, 2016). However, conditionality and sanctions do not appear to work for 475 
   





everyone, potentially driving  people off unemployment support entirely (Comptroller and 476 
Auditor General, 2016; Loopstra et al., 2015b). The same NAO analysis mentioned above 477 
also found that people on ESA who were sanctioned were actually less likely to return to 478 
work (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2016) while a cross-local authority analysis suggests 479 
sanctions may increase economic inactivity among people living with a disability (Reeves, 480 
2017). This is especially relevant to people receiving help from food banks, as many are 481 
living with mental or physical ill health (Loopstra and Lalor, 2017). However, data that 482 
enable employment and hardship outcomes to be tracked among claimants who are 483 
sanctioned and those who are not are needed for more robust analyses of potential costs of 484 
benefit sanctions alongside potential benefits (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2016). 485 
Tracking the effects of sanctions will become even more essential with the introduction of in-486 
work conditionality for Universal Credit claimants, which has raised concerns that more 487 
people will be exposed to sanctions, making these findings highly relevant to an increasing 488 
number of benefit claimants in the UK (Welfare Conditionality, 2016).  489 
Our results also have relevance for the providers of charitable food assistance and the wider 490 
problem of food insecurity in the UK. Trussell Trust data likely only capture a proportion of 491 
people who experience food insecurity; our results suggest there could be hidden hunger due 492 
to sanctioning in places where Trussell Trust food banks are not available. People in these 493 
areas may instead seek help from other agencies or non-Trussell Trust food banks, but these 494 
numbers are not reflected in Trussell Trust data. Despite known limitations of this measure 495 
(Loopstra and Tarasuk, 2015), this is currently the only longitudinal indicator of household 496 
food insecurity across areas in the UK. The Poverty and Social Exclusion survey includes an 497 
item querying if households can afford to eat two meals a day, and this figure rose from 1% 498 
to 3% over 1999 to 2012; however, the long time lag between surveys (with an intermediate 499 
time point in 2005) and small-scale nature of the survey means it cannot be used to track 500 
   





changes over time or local areas. Further, the measurement of household food insecurity 501 
should involve multi-item scales that capture the chronicity and severity of experiences of 502 
household food insecurity since it is often experienced intermittently or cyclically.  A recent 503 
cross-sectional survey of adults in the UK (Bates et al., 2017) did include the internationally 504 
validated USDA Adult Food Security Scale, and found that 8% of adults were moderately or 505 
severely food insecure (equating to an estimated 4 million adults). In contrast, Trussell Trust 506 
estimated that 500,000 unique adults and children were using their food banks over 2014/15. 507 
This discrepancy highlights how important it is for the UK to implement household food 508 
insecurity monitoring. 509 
Our findings also highlight the limitations of any charitable food support network’s ability to 510 
eradicate food insecurity. These networks are increasingly relied upon to fill in the gaps in 511 
welfare support but, by relying on volunteers and donated food and space to operate, they 512 
will vary in their capacity to address hunger in their area (Lambie-Mumford, 2013; Lambie-513 
Mumford, 2016). As such, they are not equipped to address these gaps in every part of the 514 
country and are less able to respond quickly to changes in need.  515 
These observations point to several directions for future research. The incorporation of 516 
household food insecurity and food bank usage monitoring into routine surveys conducted in 517 
the UK would enable individual analyses of the causes and consequences of these 518 
experiences. There is also a need for harmonised data collection across short-term providers 519 
of emergency assistance to enable better identification of where there may be gaps in the 520 
provision of emergency support and to enable evaluation of this support on the wider problem 521 
of food insecurity. Lastly, food bank usage is one possible harm associated with sanctioning, 522 
but other potential outcomes include declines in mental health, debt, and even death 523 
(Gentleman, 2014). Longitudinal studies of benefit claimants would enable better 524 
   





understanding of how prevalent sanctioning is and what types of outcomes are associated 525 
with this practice.526 
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Figure 1 Average monthly rates of sanctioning among Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants 
sanctioned each quarter over 2011 to 2015. 
 
Notes: Graph shows number of original sanction decisions resulting in a sanction as 
proportion of number of people claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance in England, Scotland, and 

























































































































































































































































































   





Figure 2 Relationship between sanctions applied and numbers of adult food bank users across 1 
local authorities with food banks, Jan-Mar 2014. 2 
 3 
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Figure 3 Relationship between sanctioning and adult food bank usage by concentration of 5 
food bank distribution centres in local authorities. 6 
 7 
Notes: Graph illustrates decrease and increase from mean sanction rate of 200 applied per 8 
100,000. High number of distribution sites refers to areas with 5 or more sites per 100,000 9 
and low number of distribution sites refers to areas with <1 site per 100,000 in areas with 10 
food banks present. P value for interaction of change in sanctions with high distribution sites 11 
vs. low = 0.011. For full model see Web Table A3.  12 
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Table 1 Relationship between sanctions applied and number of adult food bank users in local 13 
authorities with food banks, 2012-2015. 14 
 Adult food bank users each quarter per 100,000 adults 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Per 10 additional 
sanctions per 100,000 
adults 
6.44*** 6.35*** 3.36*** 
(0.87) (0.87) (0.84) 
Per 10 additional JSA 
claimants per 100,000 
adults 
-1.81*** -1.73*** -0.76** 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.24) 
Distribution sites per 
100,000 persons 
--- 43.9*** 33.6** 
 (12.5) (12.3) 
Weekly hours of operation 
per 100,000 persons 
--- -5.22 -4.46 
 (3.17) (3.11) 
Linear and quadratic time 
trends 
No No Yes 
Local authority-quarters 3041 3041 3041 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include dummy variable for season, 15 
dummy variable for first quarter a food bank operated, and local authority fixed effects. 16 
Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 17 
   





Table 2 Dynamic relationship between the change in number of sanctions applied from quarter-
to-quarter and change in numbers using food banks. 
 Change in number of adult food 
bank users from previous quarter 
 (1) (2) 












Per 1 additional distribution site per 
100,000 from previous quarter 
6.72* 6.28 
(3.28) (3.24) 
Per 1 additional hour open per week per 
100,000 from previous quarter 
-0.33 -0.32 
(0.43) (0.44) 
Local authority-quarters 2918 2918 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include linear and quadratic time trends, and 
dummy variables for season and first quarter a food bank operated.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
